The research reported in this book is mentalistic linguistics in the above sense, and the book's aim is to put forth and defend a means to determine, with some confidence, when to take a certain set of informant judgments as a reflection of properties of the Computational System, hypothesized to be at the center of the language faculty.

It may be important to note that while it is often stated that one of the goals of generative grammar is to characterize and predict "the possible (actual and potential) occurrence of all and only the grammatical sentences of a given language," such is not a concern of the present work as it is concerned with the language faculty (more precisely, the Computational System) rather than with language (more precisely a particular language or another) although we do draw from informant judgments on sentences of a particular language.

In the terms of Chomsky 1986, I am concerned with I-language, not E-language. As Chomsky states here and there, it seems to be a consequence of some unintended historical "accident" (i.e., the way Syntactic Structures was prepared and published, "in place of" Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory) that the false conception of the goal of generative grammar as noted above spread. The way the field of generative grammar has been over the years seems to me to have been (badly) influenced by this.

The URL given in [35922] does not seem to work now.

This link works as of 2/29/2012. As noted in [35922], [y]ou can actually get to its content at various places. Just Google "Cargo Cult Science."

The URL given in [35960] does not seem to work any longer.

This works as of 2/29/2012.

If it does not work, you can simply type "Feynman on Social Sciences" while you are on YouTube. By doing that, you will also find "Noam Chomsky on Social Sciences ...," which is also fun to watch.

If one only reads Kuhn (and/or some work that cites Kuhn), one might "classify" Popper as a naive falsificationist.

Popper's remarks as those found in Popper 1983, as cited in [27158], and in many other places, including Popper 1983: xxxi-xxxv, should at least make one think twice before one mentions Popper as a "naive falsificationist," or even as a "falsificationist."

What is called negative predictions in [28637] is now called a *Schema-based predictions.

Other than that terminological change, what is stated in [28637] and its daughter postings seem to be what I would say now. It has been 6.5 years since the posting of [28637]. There does not seem to be any sign that things are getting any better in the field.

The paper that I submitted to a journal last August -- I have not received the reviews yet -- ends with the following sentence, slightly adapted here, to avoid reference to other parts of the paper.

"Most importantly, crucial reference to confirmed schematic asymmetries as "basic units of facts" against which we evaluate our hypotheses about the Computational System of the language faculty makes us hopeful that we might be able to make generative grammar an empirical science, or to put it more accurately, to make language faculty science possible, where [the hypothetico-deductive method can be rigorously applied.^FN"

FN: One may take this statement as contentious if one thinks that generative grammar has already established itself as a science of the language faculty. As suggested in the preceding pages, my own assessment is rather different from such a view as long as we mean by "science" a field in which a hypothetico-deductive method is applied rigorously and hypotheses in question are subjected to careful and robust empirical tests. I do not, by any means, claim, however, that the method suggested here is the only way to study the language faculty. There may be other approaches to the language faculty and there may, and perhaps should, be other types of evidence beside informant intuitions that can be used for or against hypotheses about the language faculty. One might, for example, hypothesize the core property of the language faculty that is different from the model of the Computational System adopted here; one might also have a model of judgment-making that is distinct from what we adopt. The relevant hypotheses and the alternative models in question, however, must be articulated with respect to how informant judgment or other types of evidence, if relevant, is/are related to the hypothesized properties of the language faculty so that we can make testable predictions and aspire to make progress in our endeavor to understand the properties of the language faculty in a research program of language faculty science as an exact science.

More recent methodological articulation is provided under the thread Methodology [42043].

It will be pointed out that a key to making progress in language faculty science is to identify, utilize, and refine the effective experimental devices as we proceed from a simple to more and more involved experiments.

And the experimental devices include the assumptions and hypotheses that are used in designing our experiments. It goes without saying that we cannot expect to learn much about anything from the result of an experiment that is designed crucially based on assumptions and hypotheses that have been shown not to be valid. The book I am currently working on addresses how we CAN obtain confirmed predicted schematic asymmetries. But my JJL paper (Hoji 2010 "Hypothesis testing in generative grammar: Evaluation of predicted schematic asymmetries") and Hoji 2006 "Assessing Competing Analyses: Two Hypotheses about 'Scrambling' in Japanese," both of which are available here, discuss what experimental devices we should not use if we want to make progress in language faculty science (unless we can control the noise so as to be able to obtain a confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry based on such assumptions/hypotheses).

See the remarks in section 1.9 in [42415] in the Methodology board.

the draft of the book I hope I will finish soon.

I did finish the manuscript and I did submit it to a publisher, sometime in 2009.

Upon receiving a review of the manuscript, I decided to revise it substantively and ended up working on a "new book." Because of the methodological articulation and the improvement of the general experimental design (that we use) that have been made subsequent to the completion of the 2009 book manuscript, I am glad that I did not try to make minor changes to the manuscript for publication.

In the meantime, works have continued to be published which seem to me to have little, if any, concern about making progress on the basis of rigorous testability. Such work continue to use what falls FAR SHORT of a solid generalization -- which I now call a confirmed schematic asymmetry -- as an empirical basis of their proposals, and their citations among themselves continue, leading uninformed and uncritical readers the impression that something significant is really being addressed.

1.10. Outline of the book

What follows is the outline of the rest of the book. Chapter 2 deals with how we deduce testable predictions in language faculty science. The main methodological claim of the present work is that it is possible to pursue language faculty science by adopting the three heuristics in (1), repeated here.

(1) a. Secure testability.
b. Maximize testability.
c. Maximize the significance of the experimental result.

It follows from the heuristics in (1a, b) that we should try to deduce definite and testable predictions from our hypotheses. This leads us to adopt Chomsky's (1993) model of the Computational System of the language faculty because of its categorical nature. We will also be led to adopt Ueyama's (2010) model of judgment-making, which makes it possible to relate explicitly the informant judgment to hypothesized properties of the Computational System. It will be argued that, given the model of the Computational System and the model of judgment-making we adopt, we can deduce categorical predictions about the complete unacceptability of sentences of a certain schematic form and the acceptability (to varying degrees) of sentences that are minimally different from the former, under a specified interpretation. Among the issues to be addressed is how predictions are deduced in language faculty science. Language faculty science is concerned with the universal properties of the language faculty but individual experiments necessarily deal with particular languages; it thus follows that predictions in language faculty science are deduced at least by two types of hypotheses, universal and language-particular. In order to make a testable prediction about properties of the Computational System, we need a hypothesis that relates hypothesized properties of the Computational System to what we can observe. Statements that relate theoretical concepts to informant intuitions are called bridging statements and, as noted earlier, they play a crucial role in deducing testable predictions in language faculty science.

Chapter 3 deals with how we can maximize testability. The chapter proposes that the evidence for or against hypotheses about properties of the language faculty must be (based on) a confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry, which obtains if and only if experimental results are reproduced in harmony with the predicted schematic asymmetry, according to which sentences conforming to one type of Schema (*Schema) are always judged to be completely unacceptable under a specified interpretation while those conforming to the other types of Schema (okSchema) are not necessarily judged to be completely unacceptable.

We can try to maximize testability by focusing on hypotheses whose applicability is, in principle, universal. The c-command relation is the most basic structural relation directly definable in terms of the application of Merge (the only structure-building operation assumed in the Computational System), and hence we expect its effects to be "detectable" in any language. We can therefore try to maximize testability by focusing on intuitions that are (hypothesized to be) necessarily based on the c-command relation and pursue the relevant c-command-based hypotheses and their consequences, in line with the spirit of Reinhart's (1983: chapter 7) conjecture.

Among the topics to be deal with in this chapter are:

Confirmed predicted schematic asymmetries
The fundamental asymmetry between two types of predictions
*Schema-based predictions
LF c-command-based intuitions

Chapter 4 addresses how to maximize the significance of the experimental result. We would like the experimental result to be maximally significant with regard to the validity of the hypotheses that have given rise to the prediction(s) in question. If the result is in harmony with the prediction (i.e., in harmony with the predicted schematic asymmetry), we want to maximize the likelihood that it provides support for the hypotheses in question. If the result is not in harmony with the prediction, on the other hand, we want to make sure as much as possible that it indeed means that at least one of the hypotheses in question is at fault, in line with the "Maximize our chances of learning from errors" heuristic, which is a specific instance of the "Maximize the significance of the experimental result" heuristic.

There are basically two ways in which we can maximize the significance of the experimental result. One is by invoking a particular dependency interpretation whose availability is (hypothesized to be) necessarily based on a c-command relation at LF. This would significantly reduce the possibility that the informant's "Unacceptable" judgment is due to a parsing problem. In this chapter, I will articulate why it is necessary to invoke a certain dependency interpretation in our experiment in order to maximize the significance of the experimental result, at least at the initial stage of language faculty science. The other way to maximize the significance of the experimental result is by trying to maximize the effectiveness of the various experimental devices as well as the hypotheses that yield the relevant predictions.

The discussion in this chapter includes: (i) from what hypotheses and assumptions we deduce definite predictions, (ii) how the experimental results get affected not only by the choice of the relevant hypotheses and assumptions but also by the instructions given to the informants and the quality of the informants. It is for the purpose of designing experiments, interpreting the experimental results, and maximizing the significance of the experimental results that a synthesis is called for of all the considerations addressed in this work. It is in the context of such a synthesis that we can see most clearly the crucial role played by the heuristics in (1) and truly appreciate the abstract nature of our experiments despite the surface appearance that our experiments deal with specific sentences of a specific language.

As noted, although a given experiment necessarily deals with (a) particular language(s), what is really at stake is the validity of universal hypotheses. In order for the experimental result to be significant in language faculty science, it is therefore imperative that we have established as clearly and rigorously as possible that the language-particular hypotheses we have invoked in deducing the prediction in question have contributed to an independent confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry in "preliminary experiments." In order to obtain a rigorous and categorical experimental result in accordance with the prediction (i.e., the predicted schematic asymmetry), informant-classification or informant-calibration is necessary by means of "preliminary experiments." It cannot be emphasized more that such informant-calibration and informant-classification are for the purpose of maximizing the effectiveness of the experimental result, which in turn is for the purpose of maximizing the significance of the experimental device. The main purpose of this is to leave as little room as possible for making "excuses" for failing to obtain an experimental result in accordance with our prediction. Those researchers who do not pursue rigorous testability and pursue "compatibility-based research" seem to think that informant-calibration and informant-classification are for the purpose of obtaining the experimental results that we want. But the real purpose of informant-calibration and informant-grouping is to maximize the significance of the experimental result, and ultimately to maximize testability.

The topics that will be covered in this chapter include:

Invoking a dependency interpretation γ(a, b)
Universal and language-particular hypotheses
Bridging statements
Assumptions about the effects of lexical choices not included above
Maximizing the effectiveness of the experimental devices
The lexical choice
Instructions to the informants
Informant resourcefulness

Chapter 5 deals with various aspects of experiments in language faculty science. The sentences (the *Examples and the corresponding okExamples) used in our experiment are constructed on the basis of a predicted schematic asymmetry, which consists of a *Schema and the corresponding okSchemata, constructed on the basis of the relevant universal and language-particular hypotheses and the bridging statement(s). This chapter addresses what formal and non-formal considerations enter the construction of the *Examples and the okExamples in the experiment. The chapter also illustrates the general experimental design in accordance with the proposed characterization of language faculty science.

The chapter addresses the following topics:

Predicted Schematic Asymmetries
Constructing *Schemata and okSchemata
Constructing *Examples and okExamples
Experimental Design

Chapter 6 illustrates the proposed methodology in relation to the so-called scrambling construction in Japanese, one of the most extensively discussed "topics" in Japanese syntax in the generative tradition. Insofar as one considers that the derivation of the so-called scrambling construction (simply OSV) is more complex than that of its 'non-scrambled' counterpart (simply SOV), it is necessary to identify the effective experimental devices and hypotheses dealing with SOV before we begin rigorous research on OSV. And this in turn makes it necessary that we be able to determine whether a particular surface order of expressions (or somewhat more precisely, that of the major constituents of the sentence) is "basic/un-marked" or "non-basic/marked." The availability of the bound variable construal has been the most extensively used empirical means for this purpose over the years.

I will first articulate what hypotheses must be adopted in order to make the relevant predictions regarding the availability of the bound variable construal. It will then be shown that it is possible to obtain robust judgments from informants in line with the predictions. On the scale of 0-100, where "0" corresponds to "complete unacceptability" and "100" to "full acceptability," we have been able to obtain in a number of experiments the average score of around 5 on the *Schema, contrasting sharply with the corresponding okSchemata. The significance of such results should be appreciated especially in light of the fact that there seem to be no experimental results in English that are even remotely comparable to our experimental results dealing with the same type of "phenomena." It will be pointed out that a key to making progress in language faculty science is to identify, utilize, and refine the effective experimental devices as we proceed from a simple to more and more involved experiments. Some illustration of these points will be provided in relation to long-distance OSV, resumption in OSV, and local disjointness effects in Japanese.

It will be noted that Japanese seems to be a language that is well suited for language faculty science as conceived here because (i) unlike languages like English, there is an overt (i.e., morphological) means in Japanese to identify an expression β that must be dependent on another expression α at LF as long as β and α are not co-arguments of the same predicate, and (ii) the relevance of LF for the "interpretations" can be seen more transparently in Japanese than in a language like English.

The chapter addresses the following specific topics:
The LF c-command condition on bound variable construal
SOV in Japanese
OSV in Japanese
Preliminary experiments
So vs. a-NPs as the bindee
Split antecedence
The effectiveness of the various experimental devices
Hypotheses
Instructions to the informants
The choice of the binders
The choice of the bindee
Informants
Resumption in OSV in Japanese
Long-distance OSV in Japanese
Local disjointness and OSV in Japanese

In language faculty science, the researchers are consciously probing into the properties of their own mental organ (the language faculty), a feature not shared by a physical science. In Chapter 7, I will briefly review the proposed methodology in relation to various issues in philosophy of science, including those discussed by Lakatos, Popper, Duhem, Peirce, and Feynman, and address what may be special about language faculty science. I will consider how Feynman's (1965: 142) three necessary conditions for progress in science apply to language faculty science―the ability to experiment, honesty in reporting results, and the intelligence to interpret the results―in light of the discussion in the preceding chapters. In connection to this, I will also discuss the relation between the three heuristics in (1) and the hypothetico-deductive method, which will help us understand the relation between language faculty science and 'language science'.

The topics the chapter deals with include:

Lakatos' scientific research program
Popper's falsificationism
Duhem's under-determination thesis
The Hypothetico-deductive method and language faculty science

If it is indeed possible to pursue language faculty science as an exact science, it is worth considering its implications on the relation between language faculty science and 'language science', and more significantly, its much broader implications for the possibility of an exact science outside the extremely limited domains of inquiry. Chapter 8 briefly addresses how the proposed methodology, especially its emphasis on *Schema-based predictions, might prove to be useful in other research areas that deal with the human mind.

End of the draft of chapter 1.
As noted earlier, the footnotes are not provided and much of the formatting is lost here.

1.7. The pf-LF correspondences

For the purpose of deducing categorical predictions about the informant judgment, we also need language-particular hypotheses regarding the correspondences between (i) the schematic linear sequence of linguistic expressions in the language under discussion and (ii) the schematic LF (hence, hierarchical) representation(s). Such hypotheses shall be called pf-LF correspondences and will be discussed in some depth in later chapters, in relation to the so-called scrambling construction in Japanese.

1.8. Two more issues to clarify
1.8.1. Reproducibility and intermediate judgments

There are two more interrelated issues I would like to clarify in this introductory exposition; one is how to interpret "intermediate judgments," (i.e., "Not completely unacceptable but not fully acceptable"), and the other is what should count as reproducibility of our experimental results. As in any scientific research program, identifying and working with reproducible phenomena is a minimal requirement for progress. If the informant judgments are not reproducible, they do not (yet) constitute a piece of data to account for in language faculty science. Let us thus first turn to how we should characterize a reproducible phenomenon in language faculty science.

1.8.2. Schemata

First of all, it is not the informant judgment on particular sentences that would count as evidence. If we deduce a prediction that sentences conforming to a certain schema do not give rise to a certain interpretation, such an interpretation should be unavailable in any sentence conforming to that schema, no matter what lexical or pragmatic adjustments and alterations might be made on what is left unspecified in the schema. Consider the schemata in (2a) and (2b).

(2) a. NP1 Verb [ … NP2 …]
b. [ … NP2 …] Verb NP1

The only thing specified in (2) is the positions of the two NPs, NP1 and NP2. To maximize the generality of each schema, it must be understood, for a sentence that instantiates each schema, that (i) the Verb can be inflected, (ii) any materials can in principle appear in the "…" parts, (iii) verbal or sentential modifiers can appear, and (iv) it can be embedded in a larger sentence, etc. Sentences such as John hates his book (with John=NP1 and his=NP2) and every boy was looking for a book that he had bought in New York (with every boy=NP1 and he=NP2) are among the examples conforming to (2a).

Secondly, the informant judgments on a single schema alone do not constitute a "fact" in language faculty science. I maintain that we have a "fact" in language faculty science only if we have obtained informant judgments on a set of schemata in accordance with our predictions. In light of the preceding considerations, a "fact" in language faculty science must minimally involve three schemata. Sentences conforming to one of the three types of schemata are predicted to be unacceptable. Such a schema shall be called a *Schema (which can be read as "star schema") and sentences conforming to it *Examples (which can be read as "star examples"). For any *Example, there should be no N (a set of lexical items) that would result in an LF representation in which the condition for γ(a, b) would be satisfied. It should thus be predicted that any *Example should be judged completely unacceptable under γ(a, b).

Corresponding to the *Schema, there are two types of okSchemata. One type is identical in form to the *Schema, but without the specification of γ(a, b); the other type corresponds to an LF representation in which the condition for γ(a, b) is satisfied. Corresponding to okExamples conforming to the latter type of okSchema, there must be a set of lexical items N that would yield the intended LF-PF.

Provided in (3) is an instance of a set of three schemata.

(3) a. okSchema
NP1 Verb [ … NP2 …], with γ(NP1, NP2)
b. *Schema
[ … NP2 …] Verb NP1, with γ(NP1, NP2)
c. okSchema
[ … NP2 …] Verb NP1, without γ(NP1, NP2)

In order to obtain the predicted schematic asymmetry as indicated in (3), we must be able to deduce from our hypotheses that the structural condition for the intuition γ(NP1, NP2) is not satisfied in any of the LF representations corresponding to (3b) but it is satisfied in at least one LF representation corresponding to (3a). For this deduction, we must have a hypothesis about the condition on γ(NP1, NP2). In accordance with the "Maximize testability" heuristic in (1b), we should consider γ(NP1, NP2) that is based on the structural relation that is most readily discernable in any language, i.e., one that can be defined most directly in terms of the only structure-building operation assumed in the model of the Computational System adopted here. We also need hypotheses regarding the correspondences between (i) the schematic linear sequence of linguistic expressions in the language under discussion and (ii) the schematic LF (hence, hierarchical) representation(s), i.e., pf-LF correspondences, as pointed out earlier.

If the dependency interpretation holding between every player and his (i.e., γ(every player, his)) is an instance of γ(a, b) under discussion, the English examples in (4a, b, c) can instantiate the schemata in (3a, b, c), respectively.

(4) a. okExample
Every player praised his coach. (with γ(every player, his))
b. *Example
His coach praised every player. (with γ(every player, his))
c. okExample
His coach praised every player.

1.8.3. The fundamental asymmetry
The existence of an N corresponding to the presented sentence α that would result in the intended LF-PF does not necessarily mean that the informant will judge α to be acceptable. As noted above, the parsing difficulty might result in the informant's failure to come up with such an N; it is also possible that the informant reports an "intermediate acceptability" due to the (extreme) unnaturalness of the interpretation of α, quite independently from the availability of γ(a, b). Hence, the prediction in question, which we shall call an okSchema-based prediction, is that okExamples conforming to it are not necessarily completely unacceptable under γ(a, b), while a *Schema-based prediction is that any *Example should be judged completely unacceptable under γ(a, b). The recognition of this asymmetry between the two types of predictions is one of the keys to language faculty science as an exact science.

1.8.4. Intermediate judgments
We surely would like the informant judgments on the okExamples much 'better than' "just barely acceptable" or "slightly more acceptable than" the completely unacceptable *Examples. But the fundamental asymmetry that must be recognized is that *Examples are predicted to be completely unacceptable under γ(a, b) while okExamples are not. From this recognition follows how the "intermediate acceptability" is to be interpreted; "intermediate acceptability" reported by the informant must mean that there is an N that would result in the intended LF-PF. Its less-than-perfect status must be due to extra-grammatical factors for the following reason: If the condition for γ(a, b) were not satisfied in any LF representation corresponding to it, the presented sentence α should be judged to be completely unacceptable according to the *Schema-based prediction, provided that the informant clearly understands what is meant by γ(a, b) under discussion.

1.8.5. Reproducibility
Reproducibility in language faculty science should ultimately be across-language reproducibility because language faculty science is concerned with the properties that are invariant among the members of the human species. In this sense, it must be understood clearly that a given experiment in language faculty science, which necessarily deals with (a) specific language(s), should be dealing with a universal hypothesis. Hence the reproducible result in one language should in principle be replicated in any other language. Across-language reproducibility, however, can be meaningfully pursued only if we have attained within-language reproducibility, i.e., across-informant reproducibility within a language. Across-informant reproducibility in turn can be meaningfully pursued only if we have attained within-informant reproducibility, which consists of across-example reproducibility and across-occasion reproducibility. In the absence of within-informant reproducibility, with reproducibility as characterized above in terms of confirmed predicted schematic asymmetries, it would be unclear what significance we could assign to an experimental result, no matter what statistical method might be employed to analyze the data and how massive the relevant data might be.

1.9. Summary

How we can deduce a definite and categorical prediction about the informant judgment is crucially tied to the recognition of the fundamental asymmetry between the two types of predictions. For the reasons noted above, it is the informant judgments on (examples conforming to) a *Schema that we can expect to be categorical. The measurability and the reproducibility that we can aspire to obtain in language faculty science are thus about complete unacceptability and the lack thereof. It is such conceptual articulation as given above that leads to the conclusion that the study of the language faculty can become an exact science. When it comes to how we can actually obtain categorical judgments from informants, more issues need to be addressed, including the effectiveness of various experimental devices, such as the instructions given to the informants, as will be discussed in later chapters.

The present work puts forth the following theses: The informant judgments should count as a "fact" in language faculty science only if they constitute a confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry. A confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry obtains if and only if a *Schema-based prediction has survived a rigorous attempt of disconfirmation and it is accompanied by corroboration of the corresponding okSchema-based predictions. A *Schema-based prediction is that informants judge any sentence conforming to a *Schema to be completely unacceptable under γ(a, b) (a specified interpretive relation holding between two expressions a and b). An okSchema-based prediction is that informants judge sentences conforming to an okSchema to be acceptable under γ(a, b), to varying degrees. There is a fundamental asymmetry between a *Schema-based prediction and an okSchema-based prediction. The former can be disconfirmed but cannot be confirmed while the latter can be confirmed but cannot be disconfirmed. Testability is brought about most crucially by a*Schema-based prediction. In accordance with the "Secure testability" and the "Maximize testability" heuristics in (1a, b), we should therefore pursue hypotheses that would give rise to *Schema-based predictions. Furthermore, when modifying hypotheses, we should try to retain the existing *Schema-based prediction(s) or, better yet, obtain new *Schema-based predictions, again in line with the heuristic in (1a. b). In the subsequent chapters, I will elaborate on each of these points, and will illustrate them by making reference to results of a number of on-line experiments.

Unless we start accumulating results in language faculty science based on research that rigorously pursues testability, the research program initiated by Chomsky in the mid-1950s will most likely remain to be regarded as a metaphysical speculation, at least by those outside the field. The present work is an attempt to articulate how it is possible to pursue language faculty science as an exact science. It provides a conceptual basis for how that is possible in principle and empirical illustration of how that has actually been done.

1.6. The Task of the informant
1.6.1. Problems with dealing with 'simple' acceptability

Viewed this way, asking the informant about the acceptability of a given sentence amounts to asking, though obviously not in these terms, whether or not s/he can come up with a set of items N from the mental lexicon that would yield an LF-PF pair whose PF representation is non-distinct from the presented sentence α. For the ease of exposition, I shall henceforth refer to an LF-PF pair whose PF representation is non-distinct from the presented sentence α simply as the LF-PF.
The purpose of asking the informant to report his/her judgment on the acceptability of α is to find out whether there is an LF-PF pair corresponding to α. In order for the informant judgment to be significant, it must be a reflection of properties of the Computational System. And that means that we must make sure that (i) the "Not acceptable" judgment is due to some grammatical condition not being satisfied in the course of the "attempted" derivation―resulting in the failure to yield the LF-PF―and (ii) the "Acceptable" judgment is due to the existence of an N that would result in the LF-PF. It is possible, however, that the informant judges α to be unacceptable because s/he fails to come up with an N because of parsing difficulty. Likewise, it is also possible that the informant judges α to be acceptable because α is 'intelligible' (i.e., understandable) in some way even if there is no N that would result in the LF-PF. And, there does not seem to be a principled means to exclude such possibilities. If the reported "Unacceptable" judgment is due to parsing difficulty, the unacceptability in question would not be revealing about properties of the Computational System. The same holds if the reported "Acceptable" judgment is due to the 'intelligibility' of α. We are thus led to conclude, on the basis of these conceptual considerations, that it is not clear, in principle, what significance or how much significance can be assigned to the informant judgment on simple (un)acceptability of the presented sentence.

1.6.2. Solutions: Invoking a dependency interpretation

One way to maximize testability (see (1b)) is to consider hypotheses whose consequences are in principle testable in any language. Given the diverse differences among languages with respect to lexical items, it seems reasonable, for the purpose of maximizing testability, to turn our attention to some structural (i.e., hierarchical) property at LF, abstracting away from idiosyncratic lexical properties as much as possible. As noted above, the only structure-building operation assumed in the model of Computational System adopted here is one that combines two objects to form one, called Merge. Suppose we hypothesize that a certain intuition pertaining to two linguistic expressions a and b arises in the mind of the informant only if what corresponds to a and what corresponds to b at LF are in a structural relation directly definable in terms of the application of Merge such as: something stands in a structural relation R with something else if and only if the former Merges with something that contains the latter. To facilitate the exposition, let us refer to the intuition in question as γ(a, b).

We can try to avoid the problems noted in the preceding section by checking the informant judgment on the acceptability of α where the interpretation of α includes γ(a, b). What the informant is now being asked, though surely not in these terms, is whether s/he can come up with a set of lexical items N that would serve as input to the Computational System so as to yield an LF-PF pair such that (i) the structural condition for γ(a, b) would be satisfied in the LF representation, and (ii) the PF representation would be non-distinct from α. For the ease of exposition, such an LF-PF pair shall henceforth be referred to simply as the intended LF-PF.

We can greatly reduce the possibility that the informant's "Unacceptable" judgment is due to the parsing difficulty, by having the informant judge the same surface string as the presented sentence α, but crucially not involving γ(a, b). Let us call such a surface string as α'. The informant's "Unacceptable" judgment on α under γ(a, b) should not be due to parsing difficulty if the same informant has accepted α', identical to α. We can also have the same informant judge a surface string α'' that differs from α as follows: α'' is comparable to α in terms of its structural complexity; but there is hypothesized to be an LF representation corresponding to α'' (but not corresponding to α), in which the structural condition for γ(a, b) is satisfied. To the extent that the informant judges α'' to be acceptable under γ(a, b), we can reasonably conclude that the unacceptability of α under γ(a, b) reported by the same informant is due to the failure of the hypothesized condition for γ(a, b) to be satisfied in the LF representation corresponding to α.

Let us further note that another way to substantially reduce the possibility that the informant's "Acceptable" judgment is based on the 'intelligibility' of the presented sentence α is to have the same informant judge a sentence α''' that minimally differs from α with regard to whether the structural condition for γ(a, b) is satisfied; the condition is hypothesized to be satisfied in an LF representation corresponding to α, but not α'''. Suppose that the informant has judged α under γ(a, b) to be acceptable. Insofar as the same informant judges α''' to be unacceptable under γ(a, b), it seems reasonable to assume, on the basis of the informant's rejection of α''', that the informant understands what is meant by γ(a, b), and that her/his "Acceptable" judgment on α under γ(a, b) is indeed based on the LF representation corresponding to α satisfying the structural condition for γ(a, b), rather than being due to the mere 'intelligibility' of α. The relevant points will be elaborated and will be illustrated with a number of concrete examples in subsequent chapters, where we will discuss not only the structural condition for γ(a, b) but also the lexical condition(s).

In sum, by invoking γ(a, b), we can considerably reduce the problems noted in the preceding section concerning the significance of the experimental result. The general design of our on-line experiments is in accordance with the above considerations. In a later chapter, we will address in some depth how the specific aspects of the experiment are 'constructed' and how the experimental results are interpreted in accordance with the heuristics in (1).

It continues as:
(The formatting and the footnotes are not provided below.)

***
1.3. Evidence in language faculty science

There are various types of evidence that we can in principle bring to bear on the validity of our hypotheses. Some are "experimental" while others are not. Whatever type of evidence one wishes to consider, it has to be articulated how the predicted "value" can be deduced from a set of hypotheses, how a particular experimental result or an observation can be understood as a reflection of properties of the language faculty, and finally, how we can rigorously compare the prediction and the experimental result or the observation. Without minimally satisfactory answers to such questions, it remains unclear what significance can be assigned to the experimental result or the observation.

Given the assumption that the language faculty underlies our ability to relate a sequence of sounds/signs to a "meaning," it makes sense to ask informants, including ourselves, about possible correspondences between sounds/signs and "meanings." However, in light of the fact that the informant judgments, especially when "meanings" are involved, have been known to be extremely slippery, one should naturally wonder how we can justify the use of informants' introspective judgments as crucial evidence, let alone the use of the researcher's own judgments. The present work proposes a specific way to make informant judgments qualify as evidence in language faculty science, as something measurable and reproducible.

1.4. Three heuristics

The proposal is embedded in a larger methodological proposal about how we can deduce definite predictions and test them experimentally in accordance with the research heuristics in (1).

(1) a. Secure testability.
b. Maximize testability.
c. Maximize the significance of the experimental result.

I take it for granted that, regardless of the object of inquiry, one should like to adopt the research heuristics in (1) if it is at all possible to do so. The methodology proposed in the present work is a consequence of having the language faculty as the object of inquiry and adopting (1). The present work thus shares its goal with Chomsky's research program and proposes a means to achieve the goal by pursuing rigorous testability.

1.5. Deducing a categorical prediction
1.5.1. The model of the Computational System

In order to deduce a categorical prediction about informant judgments, it is necessary for (part of) the language faculty to have a categorical nature. Chomsky's (1993) model of the Computational System indeed has such a categorical nature; it is a structure-building system such that (i) its input is a set of items taken from the mental lexicon, (ii) its only structure-building operation takes two objects and forms one, and (iii) it yields two output representations, called an LF and a PF representation. The LF representation is a hierarchical organization of abstract objects and is the formal basis of the "meaning," and the PF representation underlies the "sound/sign." Given a set of items taken from the mental lexicon, the Computational System either generates or fails to generate an LF-PF pair of representations. It is in this sense that Chomsky's (1993) model of the Computational System is categorical and can serve as a basis for deducing a definite prediction.

1.5.2. The model of judgment-making

Assuming the Computational System, which has this categorical nature, however, is not sufficient for deducing a categorical prediction about the informant judgments. It must be articulated how the Computational System is involved in the act of judgment-making; otherwise, it remains unclear how the informant judgment could be revealing about the properties of the Computational System. Such a model of judgment-making has been put forth in Ueyama 2010. Ueyama (2010) proposes that the informant, upon hearing a presented sentence α, selects a set of lexical items N, in part on the basis of her/his past linguistic experience, and once the N is selected and enters the Computational System as its input, the system generates or does not generate an LF-PF pair, as noted above. We thus have a further basis for deducing a definite prediction about the informant judgment.
***

The title of the book that I am working on now is Language Faculty Science: how it becomes an exact science―a proposal and illustration.

The draft of chapter one starts as follows, disregarding the font formatting and the footnotes.

***
1.1. The Goal
It is an indubitable fact that, once they have reached a certain maturational stage, the members of the human species, barring any serious impairment, are able to produce and comprehend sentences of the language that they are exposed to. One of the most fundamental working hypotheses adopted in the present work is that there exists the language faculty underlying this ability of ours. The existence of the language faculty has been assumed by many and it has been the point of departure of Chomsky's research program although there is also a contrary view accepted by many, as indicated in N. J. Enfield's recent (2010) review article in Science "Without Social Contexts?." Chomsky has maintained over the years that we should approach the language faculty just as natural scientists approach their subject matters. It has, however, remained unclear how hypotheses about the language faculty can be put to rigorous empirical test. The problem manifests itself most acutely once we consider how the hypothetico-deductive method―the most commonly acknowledged hypothesis-testing "method" in a mature science such as physics―can be applied to language faculty science.

The present work articulates how predictions about the language faculty can be deduced from our hypotheses, how such predictions can be tested against experimental results, what should count as the relevant data in language faculty science, whether and how such data can be of a categorical nature, what kind of experimental design would maximize the significance of the experimental results, how we can make various aspects of experimental devices maximally effective, how rigorous a match we could expect between the prediction and the experimental results, along with many other related issues. It attempts to pursue and defend the thesis that it is possible to investigate the language faculty by applying the hypothetico-deductive method, i.e., by rigorously comparing the predictions deduced by our hypotheses with experimental results and observations. Insofar as we can carry this out successfully, with compelling empirical demonstration, that will constitute support for the existence of the language faculty.

1.2. Reproducibility and measurability

In physics, what is predicted and compared with experimental results (or observations) is something that is measurable (ultimately in terms of temporal and spatial values). The measurability of the relevant "data" is what makes it possible to compare a prediction with an experimental result and also to determine how much reproducibility there is to the experimental results and observations. Given that reproducibility and measurability are two prerequisites for effectively adopting the hypothetico-deductive method, it follows that predictions in language faculty science must be about something reproducible and measurable as long as we adopt the hypothetico-deductive method.

One may wonder whether it is reasonable to apply the hypothetico-deductive method to research concerned with the language faculty. After all, it is commonly understood that the "predictions" in fields outside the extremely limited domains of inquiry including physics are about differences and tendencies and that it is not possible to deduce point-value predictions in such fields. One may thus object that physics is not the right field for us to turn to as a model of our research program. One may also point out that the hypothetico-deductive method is not the only method adopted even in physical sciences. My response, briefly put, is: if it is possible to get to know something by following the hypothetico-deductive method, why would one want to adopt a less rigorous method?
***

The methodological proposals in my book can be further illustrated by discussing the following.

1. a. The use of so of so-no tyosya (intended as 'its author' not 'that author') as B of BVA(A, B). (We can show that the *Schema-based prediction fails quite badly; i.e., we already have robust results of some experiments, as discussed in Hoji 2006 (Assessing Hypotheses))
b. An 'account' of the above and how the account extends to 'quirky binding' in relation to Principle B effects in the OS as well as the SO context as discussed in chapter 4 of my book. (I had a section on (1b) in chapter 4, but I have decided not to include it in the book.)

2. Resumption and the OS construction. (Although we have not conducted an experiment that directly addresses the issue, some experiments on Negation-related issues dealt with resumption and their results were quite robust, precisely as predicted).

3. The long-distance-OS-related claim made in Saito's (2003, for example) work and the disconfirmation of its *Schema-based prediction with do-no-NP as A of BVA(A, B). This is discussed to some extent in Hoji 2006 (Assessing Hypotheses) and also in chapters 2 and 4 of my book, but not in any depth especially in light of the methodological proposals in my book.

4. Miyagawa's claim on the basis of the interaction between NEG and zen'in. (We have already conducted experiments on this and have gotten quite robust results; the *Schema-based prediction has been disconfirmed quite badly. Since the empirical claim in question seems to have played a significant role in recent years in relation to 'floating numerals' and 'scrambling', it may not be a bad idea to discuss this in the public domain for the record.)

Since the manuscript has become long enough, I plan to discuss the above in separate work(s).

My current plan is to prepare a book that will include (2) and another book that will include (1), (3) and (4).

If you would like to take a look at the draft, please email me.

You might find the following interesting.

http://jp.youtube.com/watch?v=_EZcpTTjjXY

It is only less than 2 minutes.

http://www.columbia.edu/itc/applied/wiggins/Classes/E4903/Fall2003/cargo.pdf
"Cargo Cult Science"
Richard Feynman
From a Caltech commencement address given in 1974

If you go to:

http://www.kyb.tuebingen.mpg.de/bethge/reading/Feynman_1974.pdf

you have a slightly more expanded, or slightly less shortened, version of his 1974 address than what is given at the first URL given above. Perhaps the version at the first URL is what has appeared in the book Surely You're Joking, Mr. Feynman! and what is given at the second URL is what appeared originally in "Engineering and Science" (June 1974), which might have been (or might be) a Cal-Tech-internal publication.

I highly recommend this; it is only 5 pages.
If you are a linguist, it may be an interesting exercise to ask yourself how much of what Feynman says a good scientist should do you are trying to practice in your own research. When you read my book, you can also ask how much of what Feynman has noted you think I have tried to do in the book.

The research reported in this book is mentalistic linguistics in the above sense, and the book's aim is to put forth and defend a means to determine, with some confidence, when to take a certain set of informant judgments as a reflection of properties of the Computational System, hypothesized to be at the center of the language faculty.

It may be important to note that while it is often stated that one of the goals of generative grammar is to characterize and predict "the possible (actual and potential) occurrence of all and only the grammatical sentences of a given language," such is not a concern of the present work as it is concerned with the language faculty (more precisely, the Computational System) rather than with language (more precisely a particular language or another) although we do draw from informant judgments on sentences of a particular language.

When you have put a lot of ideas together to make an elaborate theory, you want to make sure, when explaining what it fits, that those things it fits are not just the things that gave you the idea for the theory; but that the finished theory makes something else come out right, in addition.

Well, at least, we want to make sure that the finished theory makes a testable prediction beyond the things that gave you the idea for the theory. (That property sort of corresponds to 'being theoretically progressive' in Lakatos' discussion of problemshifts, as discussed in chapters 3 and 5 of my book draft. If the prediction turns out to be correct, i.e., if the finished theory indeed makes something else come out right, in addition, that would sort of corresponds to 'being empirically progressive'.) If not, the 'finished theory' is just a description of the things that gave you the idea for the theory. This is the point that seems to be understood rather poorly in generative grammar. But come to think of it, that is understandable, given what seems to me to be the general failure of the field to recognize the significance of establishing repeatable phenomena and proceeding on the basis of them.

http://www.columbia.edu/itc/applied/wiggins/Classes/E4903/Fall2003/cargo.pdf
"Cargo Cult Science"
Richard Feynman
From a Caltech commencement address given in 1974
Also in Surely You're Joking, Mr. Feynman!

(You can actually get to its content at various places. Just Google "Cargo Cult Science." To understand the first paragraph below, you may need to either look at the preceding paragraph of the document available at the site noted above or check "Cargo Cult" in Wikipedia (or something like that) unless you already know what it means. But even without understanding it completely, you will get the basic point. The basic point seems quite relevant when we consider much of the practice in generative grammar.)

***
Now it behooves me, of course, to tell you what they're missing. But it would be just about as difficult to explain to the South Sea islanders how they have to arrange things so that they get some wealth in their system. It is not something simple like telling them how to improve the shapes of the earphones. But there is one feature I notice that is generally missing in cargo cult science. That is the idea that we all hope you have learned in studying science in school--we never say explicitly what this is, but just hope that you catch on by all the examples of scientific investigation. It is interesting, therefore, to bring it out now and speak of it explicitly. It's a kind of scientific integrity, a principle of scientific thought that corresponds to a kind of utter honesty--a kind of leaning over backwards. For example, if you're doing an experiment, you should report everything that you think might make it invalid--not only what you think is right about it: other causes that could possibly explain your results; and things you thought of that you've eliminated by some other experiment, and how they worked--to make sure the other fellow can tell they have been eliminated.

Details that could throw doubt on your interpretation must be given, if you know them. You must do the best you can--if you know anything at all wrong, or possibly wrong--to explain it. If you make a theory, for example, and advertise it, or put it out, then you must also put down all the facts that disagree with it, as well as those that agree with it. There is also a more subtle problem. When you have put a lot of ideas together to make an elaborate theory, you want to make sure, when explaining what it fits, that those things it fits are not just the things that gave you the idea for the theory; but that the finished theory makes something else come out right, in addition.

In summary, the idea is to give all of the information to help others to judge the value of your contribution; not just the information that leads to judgement in one particular direction or another.
***

The methodological proposals in my book can be further illustrated by discussing the following.

1. a. The use of so of so-no tyosya (intended as 'its author' not 'that author') as B of BVA(A, B). (We can show that the *Schema-based prediction fails quite badly; i.e., we already have robust results of some experiments, as discussed in Hoji 2006 (Assessing Hypotheses))
b. An 'account' of the above and how the account extends to 'quirky binding' in relation to Principle B effects in the OS as well as the SO context as discussed in chapter 4 of my book. (I had a section on (1b) in chapter 4, but I have decided not to include it in the book.)

2. Resumption and the OS construction. (Although we have not conducted an experiment that directly addresses the issue, some experiments on Negation-related issues dealt with resumption and their results were quite robust, precisely as predicted).

3. The long-distance-OS-related claim made in Saito's (2003, for example) work and the disconfirmation of its *Schema-based prediction with do-no-NP as A of BVA(A, B). This is discussed to some extent in Hoji 2006 (Assessing Hypotheses) and also in chapters 2 and 4 of my book, but not in any depth especially in light of the methodological proposals in my book.

4. Miyagawa's claim on the basis of the interaction between NEG and zen'in. (We have already conducted experiments on this and have gotten quite robust results; the *Schema-based prediction has been disconfirmed quite badly. Since the empirical claim in question seems to have played a significant role in recent years in relation to 'floating numerals' and 'scrambling', it may not be a bad idea to discuss this in the public domain for the record.)

Since the manuscript has become long enough, I plan to discuss the above in separate work(s).

[Here is the table of contents as of 1/9/2009.]

A Foundation of Generative Grammar as an Empirical Science
by Hajime Hoji

Chapter 1: Introduction
1. Introduction1
2. Chomsky's (1965) challenge5
3. The goal and the main claims8
4. Outline of chapters 2-5 13
4.1. Chapter 2 13
4.2. Chapter 3 13
4.3. Chapter 4 13
4.4. Chapter 5 14
5. Answering Chomsky's challenge15

Chapter 2: Repeatable Phenomena
1. Introduction2
2. Repeatable Phenomena3
2.1. *Schemas, *Examples, okSchemas, okExamples and repeatable phenomena3
2.2. The asymmetry between *Schemas and okSchemas7
2.3. Across-speaker repeatability and within-speaker repeatability8
2.4. Repeatable phenomena, hypotheses, and progress in generative grammar8
2.5. Summary10
3. Some Illustration10
3.1. Introduction10
3.2. Hypotheses not backed up by a repeatable phenomenon in Japanese12
3.2.1. Zibunzisin12
3.2.1.1. Experimental design12
3.2.1.2. Results of experiments14
3.2.2. Otagai16
3.2.2.1. Experimental design16
3.2.2.2. Results19
3.3. Repeatable Phenomena in Japanese20
3.3.1. Introduction20
3.3.2. So-NPs vs. A-NPs20
3.3.2.1. Background: the demonstratives in Japanese20
3.3.2.2. So-NPs vs. a-NPs21
3.3.2.3. Experimental design24
3.3.2.4. Results25
3.3.3. Weak crossover, reconstruction, and the OS Construction in Japanese25
3.3.3.1. The Initial observation25
3.3.3.2. Two types of dependency in Ueyama 199827
3.3.3.3. *Schemas and an okSchema28
3.3.3.4. More okSchemas based on the OS constructions in Japanese29
3.3.3.5. LF-c-command-based BVA31
3.3.3.6. Results33
3.3.3.7. Precedence-based BVA35
3.3.3.8. Results37
4. Concluding remarks39
5. Appendix42

Chapter 3: Theory of Judgment Making and Its Consequences
1. Introduction2
2. Theory of judgment making3
2.1. Introduction3
2.2. The model of judgment making and the CS5
2.2.1. How the theory of the CS is embedded in the model of judgment making5
2.2.2. Difficulty9
2.2.3. The major subject construction10
2.2.4. The OS (Object Subject) construction12
2.2.5. Summary14
2.3. The model of quantifying the informant judgment15
2.4. The informant's sensitivity and resourcefulness17
2.4.1. String/meaning sensitivity17
2.4.2. Structural/contextual resourcefulness17
2.5. Summary20
3. Some consequences21
3.1. The asymmetry between *Schemas and okSchemas21
3.2. Focusing on *Examples22
3.3. The advantage of single-informant experiments26
4. Bridging statements and predictions29
4.1. Making hypotheses testable29
4.1.1. Bridging statements29
4.1.2. Bridging statements and the asymmetry between *Schemas and okSchemas31
4.2. Predictions34
4.2.1. Two types of predictions34
4.2.2. Confirmation and disconfirmation of Predictions36
4.2.3. Single and multiple-informant experiments38
4.3. Summary43
5. Repeatable phenomena and the significance of the informant judgment45
5.1. The asymmetry between a *Schema and an okSchema45
5.2. When do we obtain a repeatable phenomenon?47
5.3. Single-informant and multiple-informant experiments49
5.4. Summary52
6. Predictions, auxiliary hypotheses and heuristics53
6.1. Introduction53
6.2. The model of prediction making54
6.3. When a prediction fails60
6.3.1. Auxiliary hypotheses60
6.3.2. When a *Schema-based prediction gets disconfirmed63
6.3.3. When an okSchema-based prediction fails to be confirmed66
6.4. Heuristics69
6.4.1. Progressive and degenerating problemshifts69
6.4.2. Heuristics for single-informant and multiple-informant experiments72
6.4.3. Summary73
7. Summary75

Chapter 4: Anaphoric Relations in Japanese
1. Introduction1
2. The BVA (Bound variable anaphora)2
2.1. The linguistic intuition BVA2
2.2. The bridging statement6
2.2.1. The Lexical condition6
2.2.2. The Structural condition8
2.3. The Model of prediction making16
2.4. Modification18
2.5. Further modification24
2.6. Some methodological clarification27
3. BVA and "Principle B" Effects30
3.1. A Problem30
3.2. Modification regarding pf-LF correspondences35
3.3. Further modifications39
3.3.1. A new repeatable phenomenon39
3.3.2. An account44
3.3.3. A new prediction49
3.3.4. Further predictions53
4. "Principle B" effects for coreference: a further prediction55
5. The Hypotheses about zibunzisin and otagai, revisited59
5.1. Eliminating a *Schema-based prediction and adding a new one59
5.2. Attempts to 'save' the zibunzisin-as-a-local-anaphor hypothesis60
5.2.1. The initial formulation60
5.2.2. Modification attempted62
5.3. Attempts to 'save' the otagai-as-a-local-anaphor hypothesis67
5.4. Summary68
6. Summary68
7. Appendix: Hoji 1995 70

Chapter 5: The Essentials of the Proposal
1. The Proposal stated in terms of Lakatos 1970/19781
2. The Model of judgment making4
2.1. Judgments on the acceptability of sentence α with interpretation γ(a, b)4
2.2. Judgments on the acceptability of sentence α13
3. The Model of prediction making and Duhem's problem20
3.1. The model of prediction making20
3.2. Duhem's problem and reference to γ(a, b)22
4. The Reinhartian heuristic24
5. Summary and remaining issues26

Appendix: Comparison with Schütze's (1996) Model of Judgment Making
1. Introduction1
2. The Models of Judgment Making2
2.1. The Schütze 1996 model and the Ueyama model2
2.2. The main differences5
2.3. More details8
3. Summary11
3.1. Initial concerns11
3.2. The use of the informant judgments11
3.3. Gradient judgments12
3.4. The use of the researcher as the informant14
3.5. Repeatable phenomena15

Chomsky (1965: 4) states, "To study actual linguistic performance, we must consider the interaction of a variety of factors, of which the underlying competence of the speaker-hearer is only one. In this respect, study of language is no different from empirical investigation of other complex phenomena." This seems to be Chomsky's consistent position over the years. Chomsky (1988), for example, states as in (66) and Schütze (1996) reports as in (67).

(66)As for my own methods of investigation, I do not really have any. The only method of investigation is to look hard at a serious problem and try to get some ideas as to what might be the explanation for it, meanwhile keeping an open mind about all sorts of other possibilities. Well, that is not a method. It is just being reasonable, and so far as I know, that is the only way to deal with any problem, whether it is a problem in your work as a quantum physicist or whatever. (Chomsky 1988: 190)

(67)Chomsky (personal communication) believes that research practice in linguistics ought to follow that in the natural sciences, where (in contrast to the social sciences) "almost no one devotes attention to 'methodology'." Obviously, I disagree. (Schütze 1996: 210, note 1)

In chapter 5 of my book, I present my own view in relation to Chomsky's view stated above.

[Here is the table of contents, as of 11/30/2008.]

A Foundation of Generative Grammar as an Empirical Science
by Hajime Hoji

Chapter 1: Introduction
1. Introduction 1
2. Chomsky's (1965) challenge 4
3. The goal and the main claims 7
4. Outline of chapters 2-5 12
4.1. Chapter 2 12
4.2. Chapter 3 12
4.3. Chapter 4 13
4.4. Chapter 5 13
5. Answering Chomsky's challenge 14

Chapter 2: Repeatable Phenomena
1. Introduction 1
2. Repeatable Phenomena 2
2.1. *Schemas, *Examples, okSchemas, okExamples and repeatable phenomena 3
2.2. The asymmetry between*Schemas and okSchemas 8
2.3. Across-speaker repeatability and within-speaker repeatability 10
2.4. Repeatable phenomena, hypotheses, and progress in generative grammar 11
2.5. Summary 13
3. Some Illustration 14
3.1. Introduction 14
3.2. Hypotheses not backed up by a repeatable phenomenon in Japanese 16
3.2.1. Zibunzisin 16
3.2.1.1. Experimental design 17
3.2.1.2. Results 20
3.2.2. Otagai 22
3.2.2.1. Experimental design 23
3.2.2.2. Results 27
3.3. Repeatable Phenomena in Japanese 29
3.3.1. Introduction 29
3.3.2. So-NPs vs. A-NPs 29
3.3.2.1. Background: the demonstratives in Japanese 29
3.3.2.2. So-NPs vs. a-NPs 31
3.3.2.3. Experimental design 34
3.3.2.4. Results 36
3.3.3. Weak crossover, reconstruction and the OS Construction in Japanese 36
3.3.3.1. The Initial Observation 36
3.3.3.2. Two types of dependency in Ueyama 1998 38
3.3.3.3. *Schemas and an okSchema 41
3.3.3.4. More okSchemas based on the OS constructions in Japanese 42
3.3.3.5. LF-c-command-based BVA Paradigms 45
3.3.3.6. Results 47
3.3.3.7. Precedence-based BVA 50
3.3.3.8. Results 54
4. Concluding remarks 56

Chapter 4: Theory of Judgment Making and Its Consequences
1. Introduction 1
2. Theory of judgment making 1
2.1. Introduction 1
2.2. The model of judgment making and the CS 3
2.2.1. How the theory of the CS is embedded in the model of judgment making 3
2.2.2. Difficulty 5
2.2.3. The major subject construction 6
2.2.4. The OS (Object Subject) construction 7
2.2.5. Summary 9
2.3. The judgment by the informant 9
2.4. The informant's sensitivity and resourcefulness 10
2.4.1. String/meaning sensitivity 10
2.4.2. Structural/contextual resourcefulness 11
2.5. Summary 12
3. Some consequences 13
3.1. The asymmetry between *Schemas and okSchemas 13
3.2. Focusing on *Examples 14
3.3. Single and multiple-informant research 17
4. Bridging statements and predictions 18
4.1. Making hypotheses testable 18
4.1.1. Bridging statements 19
4.1.2. Bridging statements and the asymmetry between *Schemas and okSchemas 20
4.2. Predictions 22
4.2.1. Two types of predictions 22
4.2.2. Confirmation and disconfirmation of Predictions 24
4.2.3. Single and multiple-informant research 25
4.3. Summary 28
5. Repeatable phenomena and the significance of the informant judgment 29
5.1. The asymmetry between a *Schema and an okSchema 29
5.2. When do we obtain a repeatable phenomenon? 31
5.3. Single-informant and multiple-informant research 32
5.4. Summary 34
6. Predictions, auxiliary hypotheses and heuristics 35
6.1. Introduction 35
6.2. The model of prediction making 35
6.3. When a prediction fails 39
6.3.1. Auxiliary hypotheses 39
6.3.2. When a *Schema-based prediction gets disconfirmed 41
6.3.3. When an okSchema-based prediction fails to be confirmed 43
6.4. Heuristics 45
6.4.1. Progressive problemshift 45
6.4.2. Heuristics for single-informant research and multiple-informant research 46
6.4.3. Summary 48
7. Summary 49

Chapter 4: Empirical Illustration: Anaphoric Relations in Japanese
1. Introduction 1
2. The BVA (Bound variable anaphora) 1
2.1. The linguistic intuition BVA 1
2.2. The bridging statement 6
2.2.1. The Lexical condition 6
2.2.2. The Structural condition 7
2.3. The Model of prediction making 14
2.4. Modification 17
2.5. Further modification 23
2.6. Some methodological clarification 26
3. BVA and "Principle B" Effects 29
3.1. A Problem 29
3.2. Modification regarding pf-LF correspondences 34
3.3. Further modifications 38
3.3.1. A new repeatable phenomenon 38
3.3.2. An account 42
3.3.3. A new prediction 46
3.3.4. Further predictions 51
4. "Principle B" effects for coreference: a further prediction 53
5. The Hypotheses about zibunzisin and otagai, revisited 56
5.1. Eliminating a *Schema-based prediction and adding a new one 56
5.2. Attempts to 'save' the zibunzisin-as-a-local-anaphor hypothesis 58
5.2.1. The initial formulation 58
5.2.2. Modification attempted 60
5.3. Attempts to 'save' the otagai-as-a-local-anaphor hypothesis 64
5.4. Summary 65
6. Summary 66
Appendix: Hoji 1995

Chapter 5: The Essentials of the Proposal
1. The Proposal stated in terms of Lakatos 1970/1978 1
2. The Model of judgment making 4
2.1. Judgments on the acceptability of sentence αwith interpretation γ(a, b) 4
2.2. Judgments on the acceptability of sentence alpha 13
3. The Model of prediction making and Duhem's problem 19
3.1. The model of prediction making 19
3.2. Duhem's problem and reference to γ(a, b) 21
4. The Reinhartian heuristic 23
5. Summary and remaining issues 24

Chomsky 1995: 6-7 states as in (38).

(38)　　This way of formulating the issues, within the P&P model, brings out clearly a crucial inadequacy in the characterization of language as a state of the language faculty. The latter [I think this refers to 'a state of the language faculty', HH] can hardly be expected to be an instantiation of the initial state with parameter values fixed. Rather, a state of the language faculty is some accidental product of varied experience, of no particular interest in itself, no more so than other collections of phenomena in the natural world (which is why scientists do experiments instead of recording what happens in natural circumstances). My personal feeling is that much more substantial idealization is required if we hope to understand the properties of the language faculty, but misunderstandings and confusion engendered even by limited idealization are so pervasive that it may not be useful to pursue the matter today. Idealization, it should be noted, is a misleading term for the only reasonable way to approach a grasp of reality. (The emphasis is as in the original.)

What is meant by "this way of formulating the issues, within the P&P model" is the thesis expressed in (39).

(39) 　(Chomsky 1995: 6)
　a. 　Language differences and typology should be reducible to choice of values of parameters.
　　b. 　[The options in question] are restricted to formal features of functional categories...
　　c. 　In this context, language acquisition is interpreted as the process of fixing the parameters of the initial state in one of the permissible ways. A specific choice of parameter settings determines a language in the technical sense that concerns us here...

The view expressed above, in particular "much more substantial idealization is required if we hope to understand the properties of the language faculty," seems to be quite consistent with what we are pursuing. First all, "predict[ing] the possible (actual and potential) occurrence of all and only the grammatical sentences of a given language" is no longer "the minimum requirement' of a successful generative grammar, i.e., of a theory of the Computational System, or even of a 'theory' of a particular grammar if that is meant to be a combination of the Computational System and the mental Lexicon of the speaker of the language once we accept the conception of the goal of generative grammar and the methodological proposal about how we can assess our hypotheses about the Computational System. Once we have liberated ourselves from the 'minimum requirement', our research seems to be indeed making "much more substantial idealization" than, i.e., beyond, assuming "the idealized speaker-hearer," which we can understand is quite close, if not identical, to our "idealized informant-researcher." The notion of "the idealized speaker-hearer" is not addressed specifically with respect to experiments in Chomsky 1965, unlike "the idealized informant" in my book, and that is perhaps the only crucial difference between Chomsky's "idealized speaker-hearer" and my "idealized informant."
　　Our idealization can be seen, for example, in our answer to (40a) that it is a repeatable phenomenon, which can be understood, roughly, as a generalization whose defining characteristic is a contrast between total unacceptability and the lack thereof, rather than a mere 'statistically significant' contrast. (I will present the essential idea behind repeatable phenomena and illustrate the notion in chapter 2, and provide further articulation of the conceptual basis of repeatable phenomena and related issues in chapter 3.)

(40)　Two specific concerns stemming from (8):
a.What qualifies as data for research concerned with the properties of the Computational System?
b.How could we evaluate our hypotheses about the Computational System?

(8)　How should we proceed in order to ensure progress toward the goal of discovering the properties of the CS?


I might note, in relation to (41), that it indeed seems to be the case that interesting tests can be carried out only by involving a fairly involved experiment, as is illustrated in my book in some depth.

(41)　(Chomsky 1965: 21)
Perhaps the day will come when the kinds of data that we now can obtain in abundance will be insufficient to revolve deeper questions concerning the structure of language. However, many questions that can realistically and significantly be formulated today do not demand evidence of a kind that is unavailable or unattainable without significant improvements in objectivity of experimental technique.

Chomsky 1995: 6-7 states as in (i).

(i) This way of formulating the issues, within the P&P model, brings out clearly a crucial inadequacy in the characterization of language as a state of the language faculty. The latter [which seems to refer to 'a state of the language faculty', HH] can hardly be expected to be an instantiation of the initial state with parameter values fixed. Rather, a state of the language faculty is some accidental product of varied experience, of no particular interest in itself, no more so than other collections of phenomena in the natural world (which is why scientists do experiments instead of recording what happens in natural circumstances). My personal feeling is that much more substantial idealization is required if we hope to understand the properties of the language faculty, but misunderstandings and confusion engendered even by limited idealization are so pervasive that it may not be useful to pursue the matter today. Idealization, it should be noted, is a misleading term for the only reasonable way to approach a grasp of reality. (The emphasis is as in the original.)

While we emphasize the significance of across-informant repeatability, it should be made clear that how much across-informant repeatability obtains 'statistically' would in principle be of little significance if we did not obtain within-informant repeatability, as will be discussed in chapter 3. We will consider in chapter 3 the idealized researcher-informant whose judgments would not be affected by any difficulty imposed by parsing or pragmatic considerations, very much along the lines of the idealization in Chomsky 1965: 3 in regard to "an ideal speaker-listener, in a completely homogeneous speech-community, who knows its language perfectly and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest, and errors (random or characteristic) in applying his knowledge of the language in actual performance."

[Here is a somewhat more expanded version of [34795].]

Chomsky (1965: 4) remarks that "linguistic theory is mentalistic, since it is concerned with discovering a mental reality underlying behavior" and in note 1 (p. 193) appended there states that "[m]entalistic linguistics is simply theoretical linguistics that uses performance as data (along with other data, for example, the data provided by introspection) for determination of competence, the latter being taken as the primary object of its investigation." The research reported in this book is mentalistic linguistics in the above sense, and the book's aim is to put forth and defend a means to determine, with some confidence, when to take a certain set of informant judgments as a reflection of properties of the Computational System, hypothesized to be at the center of the language faculty. The book addresses how we can approach, and formulate our hypotheses, about the Computational System in a way empirically testable, presents a conceptual basis for its proposal and provides empirical illustration of the methodological proposals.
Among the general theses put forth and defended in this book are:

--The empirical justification for our hypotheses about the Computational System as to whether and in what way they are linked to native speakers' linguistic intuitions.^{Note 1}
--It is not a priori clear what linguistic intuitions are likely to be a reflection of, and hence revealing about, properties of the Computational System; given our goal, identifying such linguistic intuitions is in fact part of the task of the researcher.
--There is a way to identify such linguistic intuitions.
--Once we adopt a means to identify such linguistic intuitions, we can capitalize on it in evaluating the empirical consequences of our hypotheses about the Computational System.

One of the main methodological points of the book is its claim that it is possible to, and we in fact should proceed so as to be able to, learn something about the Computational System from the disconfirmation of a certain type of predictions.

Note 1: Cf. Einstein and Infeld's (1938: 294) "Science is not just a collection of laws, a catalogue of unrelated facts. It is a creation of the human mind, with its freely invented ideas and concepts. Physical theories try to form a picture of reality and to establish its connection with the wide world of sense impressions. Thus the only justification for our mental structures is whether and in what way our theories form such a link." (in 'Physics and Reality', the last section of The Evolution of Physics by Einstein and Infeld, originally published in 1938. The page reference is to the 2007 edition, Simon & Schuster, New York.) See also "Summary" of "Physics and Reality" in Einstein 1936/1954, p. 322. Bridging statements, to be introduced in chapter 3, are none other than an attempt to link our hypotheses about the properties of the Computational System (CS) with the 'sense impressions' as hypothesized to arise from the postulated properties of the CS.

Chomsky (1965: 4) remarks that "linguistic theory is mentalistic, since it is concerned with discovering a mental reality underlying behavior" and in note 1 (p. 193) appended there states that "[m]entalistic linguistics is simply theoretical linguistics that uses performance as data (along with other data, for example, the data provided by introspection) for determination of competence, the latter being taken as the primary object of its investigation." The research reported in this book is mentalistic linguistics in the above sense, and the book's aim is to put forth and defend a means to determine, with some confidence, when to take a certain set of informant judgments as a reflection of properties of the Computational System.